Arrábida Meetings
Every year, the Arrábida Monastery gives its name to a cycle of meetings dedicated to the analyses of political, social, scientific, historical and artistic subjects, either at a national or an international level.
Some of these meetings have been held, since 2008, at the Museu do Oriente.
As part of the programme, the Arrábida Meetings have been held at the Monastery every May since 1994. This is a forum for the discussion of political and strategic matters which brings together some of the world’s leading strategists.
The steering committee of the Arrábida Meetings is presided over by Chris Patten the other members being Carlos Monjardino, José Cutileiro, Uffe Elleman-Jensen, Yegor Gaidar, Marcílio Moreira and Jaime Gama.
Arrábida meetings
16TH MEETING ON 26-28 MAY 2011
PRESS COMMUNIQUE
The 16th annual Arrábida Meeting hosted by the Chairman of the Fundaçao Oriente, Carlos Monjardino, under the chairmanship of Lord (Chris) Patten, Chancellor of the University of Oxford, Chairman of the BBC Trust and former Member of the European Commission in charge of External Relations, was held on May 26-28 around 15 international leaders from EU countries, China, India and Brazil active in politics, business and academia (refer to attached programme and list of participants).
The opening public session held at the Orient Museum of the Foundation in Lisbon addressed the question “Does the European Union still matter?” The clear response from the participants was a qualified “yes” although not as much as Europe should matter in world affairs. After a historic review of the exceptional success of the European Project over the past 60 years, the EU faces new challenges which have yet to be tackled and, to start, an economic model no longer seen as successful when compared to the past exemplified by growing tensions between a single currency union and a decentralised fiscal policy retained in the national orbit, as well as increasing competitiveness gaps between its Northern and Southern member countries. Europe is also faced by a decreasing and ageing population whilst concomitantly requiring boosted growth rates. The EU per se is increasingly unwilling to work in and speak up with a “single voice” in international fora which aggravates the problems. In the area of foreign and security policy, the Union is struggling to devise more common policies with 27 Nation-States wishing to retain their sovereign hand: more effective external policies come about when effective internal policies are at play. Examples abound, from the lack of a common energy policy with Russia to “enlargement fatigue” on its Eastern borders, the Western Balkans or with Turkey. To sum up, the EU “does matter” in many instances, having successfully stabilized the European continent although yet to be fully completed; in the Middle East and North Africa but where Europe’s effective response to the Arab Spring is still keenly awaited, and in its commitment and engagement to multilateralism in addressing today’s interdependent world such as in global trade issues or environmental challenges. Should the EU wish to play a leading role in shaping the multi-polar world, it must cast aside a dangerous return to bilateral practices such as too clearly visible in its multiple 27+1 relations to China.
China concurred that the EU “did matter” in the world political economy inasmuch as it remained a staunch and frank advocator of international financial reform; a prominent 2
flag waver in addressing climate change; playing a leading role in non-proliferation and possessing a primary security function as a “stabiliser” of the European continent as well as a major actor for peace in its neighbourhood. The EU pushes for “global governance” and is thus a primary “experimenter” and advocator for a “post-modern” world. However, the EU does not or matters less in several major areas such as in the deficit of its hard military willpower or in a common and strongly asserted foreign policy. The same applies in matters related to East Asian security, be it in the North Korean or East Asian maritime problems; the China-Japan antagonism; Taiwan or China-US strategic rivalry. Finally, China regrets Europe’s too great dependency on its trans-Atlantic emphasis at the expense of a broader view of the world which must nowadays include Asia.
The current European financial crisis was thereupon addressed as a major and urgent issue by the participants looking at both the future of the Euro and at its wider implications for the European Project at large. A detailed review of the ten year record of EMU was analysed, characterized as a “big party” for some countries where cost and price disciplines were lost and where financing of external deficits was not seen as a problem. This era of debt created dependence on foreign investors and a costly reliance on foreign borrowing. The sovereign debt crisis affecting banks ensued with banks relying on the ECB and the latter concentrating on lending to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Bank exposures to risky countries were likewise highlighted. The unavoidable outcome was highlighted i.e. positions within the intra-Eurosystem ranging far apart with major discrepancies increasing between creditor and debtor nations. All in all, EMU reform is required in order to overcome its basic flaw where present insolvencies continue to be treated as liquidity problems. The consequence of such a flawed outlook is continuous pressure for austerity in insolvent countries and continuous payments by solvent countries which will create tensions and public resistance against the EMU in both country groups.
The risk of an EMU break-up increases with its political overflow on the EU construction at large including the rise of centrifugal forces within Europe: more transfers from creditor nations fuel nationalistic movements and, within debtor nations, less social spending leads to a majority of the population rejecting any adjustment. This retrenchment where states purchase domestic order at the expense of international disorder leads necessarily to a collision between debtors and creditors and to the re-emergence of forces threatening the EU at its core. “Solidarity” is no longer the game in town; in addition the National interest is no longer seen in the broader context of a European interest. Participants asked themselves why the glue of integration is disintegrating and noted recent historic shifts, from German unification, weakened capacity of governments to address globalisation, the recent financial shocks and ensuing recession to the realisation in the EU that the world no longer “belongs to Europe” nor to the West at large. The obvious conclusion is that member states reclaim their sovereignty ushering in a new European continent of sovereign states at the expense of a more federally-pooled Europe of Nation-States. In order to reverse this dangerous trend, the EMU Project has to adapt lest it disintegrates, and overcome its 3
inconsistencies where growth can no longer be envisaged with the current rules of fiscal sovereignty, no default nor bail-outs cumulating in no exit strategies nor disciplinary measures: economic governance is urgently required with a strong system of incentives and surveillance casting aside a purely negatively-perceived sanctions regime. The re-nationalisation of European policies must be resisted. The European Project may be changing but contradictions must be lifted between a greatly required integrative thrust for sustaining the Euro when at the same time the political and social levels of the willingness to integrate further is diminishing day-by-day. To summarize, the Euro-disease can be cured but the medicine must not kill the patient.
Trends in EU relations with Asia were another notable facet of this year’s Arrabida discussions: From an Asian perspective -- including from China, India and Japan --Europe’s role in the region requires clarification. The EU looks at Asia from a purely economic vantage although it has a role to play as a “model” of integrative processes, albeit with obvious caveats. Concerns were flagged of a spill-over effect of the Eurozone crisis onto Asia but the EU retains its positive impact in “multilateralizing” UN institutions to the benefit of all. However, participants wondered whether the EU was more than a collection of sovereign states and questioned its added value in the region. Concerns dominate in Asia that rhetorical support for the reform of international organizations allowing for greater representativeness of all global players is not converted into action. Hence, the EU is not seen in Asia as a vital part of its political relationship. No true Beijing-Brussels link exists and China continues to see Europe through the prism of a “balance of power” relationship where individual states play the leading role. However, the EU has successfully pushed China to be more responsible in global governance as defined by the Europeans themselves, in itself a strategic and political sign that “Europe does matter”. But Europe shows no real concerns to where China has real strategic concerns i.e. in North and Southeast Asia and the surrounding seas and, concomitantly, China has no serious security concerns in the Middle East or North Africa. Bridging the perception gap will be important in the future where for both actors the United States remain central. The participants recalled that Asia remains more fractious than Europe with each Asian country divided and behaving differently on various strategic topics. Efforts of community-building in Asia are continuing but, as an example, ASEAN seems to be implementing “make-believe” regionalism. The EU expected reciprocal agreements from China such as on access which never materialized: now, China’s new strategy is to move directly into Europe concentrating in the Mediterranean peripheral countries and thus challenging the EU’s wherewithal. To conclude, Europe shares a common value system with Japan and India. On the other hand, China shares common interests with Europe but also, common “values” in some distinctive areas since Deng Xiaoping’s opening and which should not be disregarded. There were full discussions of the challenges facing both India and Japan, not least in the latter case following the earthquake and tsunami.
Europe and the “Arab Spring” was the theme of the concluding session addressing Europe’s responses to historic developments in its immediate neighbourhood. 4
Participants recalled that as early as during the Portuguese 2007 EU Presidency the future of the EU’s southern neighbourhood was at the top of the political agenda. The Arab Awakening needs to be aggressively addressed in a strategic way, a far greater challenge to Europe than at the time of the Soviet collapse: Arab countries and particularly Tunisia and Egypt are now governed by regimes allied to the West albeit with utterly different societies and cultures. Internal and external stresses will need to be deftly managed in order to avoid a disruption of relations with the West and for global economic recovery. The opportunity exists for the first time to work together on a common agenda with countries now sharing common values of democracy and inter-faith dialogues. Dealing with political Islam will become necessary as well as building a strategy of containment with radical Islam whilst dealing with and accommodating the Moderate forces. A Marshall Plan for the region will need to be sought as well as expanding a common and comprehensive security system in the region to include the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict such as through the presence of NATO guaranteeing the borders and security of both states. Participants underlined that each Arab country needs to be differentiated and Europe’s response tailored accordingly. But the EU is not in a position to shape events unfolding during this Arab Spring when compared to 1989/1990 in Europe. The more democratic the Arab world becomes the more anti-Israeli its policies may be. The EU will need to be ahead of US policy in the region and, if played correctly, can be creative such as by building bridges with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas which will have a cost for its relationship with the US: the EU must herein express a more autonomous position. Beyond the economic lever, Europe must also devise a serious repositioning of its policy towards the MENA countries lest it loses its credibility and waste its money: social justice and equity must be at the forefront of the new strategy of the Union, and find ways and means in its discourse to avoid equating “modernity” with “westernisation” when addressing the new Arab world. The participants concluded by underling the unique opportunity to propose a different vocabulary for a dialogue with the Arab world which recognizes the importance of identity.
The forces of change now unleashed in the region and welcomed by Europe will be tremendous engines in the modernisation of Arab societies. The EU “will want to matter” at this historic juncture. The Arab Awakening is for the EU the test case of the new Lisbon Treaty: after “what went wrong”, it must “get it right” and cannot let slip this unique opportunity should it wish to play a role commensurate with its clout and past history in the 21st century.
The 17h Arrábida Meeting will be convened in the spring of 2012.
Contacts
